In this paper, we first construct a one-round Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol based on Ring-LWE. The security of our construction is based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem. Second, we adaptively extend our construction from Ring-LWE to LWE. Finally, we efficiently implement our key exchange protocols based on Ring-LWE and LWE.
INTRODUCTION
Key exchange protocol is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitive. This protocol allows two or more parties to exchange information over an insecure public network and agree upon a common session key, which can be used for later secure communication between them. So, secure key exchange protocols work as basic building block for constructing other higher-level secure protocols.
Constructing secure key exchange protocol has received much attention [1] . Diffie and Hellman [2] proposed the first 2-party one-round key exchange protocol, whose security depends on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Similarly, one can directly construct a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol based on the discrete logarithm over elliptic curve. The breakthrough in key agreement is that Joux [3] constructed a one-round 3-party key agreement protocol using pairings on elliptic curve. But these protocols are insecure in quantum computing setting [4] .
Designing lattice-type key exchange protocol is a feasible approach. Ding, Xiang and Lin [5] described a simple provably secure key exchange protocol using a variant of learning with errors (LWE), which is called a small LWE problem. However, their construction is not one-round, but rather a 2-round protocol. Georgescu [6] described a oneround Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol using the LWE and SIS (short integer solution) problems.
Nevertheless, their protocol cannot be extended to Ring-LWE, and its efficiency is very low and impractical. On the other hand, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [7] recently described a plausible multilinear map using ideal lattices, and constructed a one-round multipartite Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol based on their multilinear map. But the security of their construction relies on the graded DDH problem, which is a new unconventional assumption. Thus at present, there does not exist LWE-based (or Ring-LWE) one-round Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
Our main contribution is to describe a one-round 2-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol based on Ring-LWE. Our scheme uses a new method to generate a shared information using integers that are close to each other. Namely, our construction is to extract the most significant bits from every coefficient of ring element, whereas their scheme in [5] is to extract the least significant bits. Due to this difference, our scheme is a one-round protocol, whereas their scheme is a two-round protocol.
Our second contribution is to extend our construction from Ring-LWE to LWE. Moreover, we also implement our protocol based on Ring-LWE/LWE.
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
Let be the security parameter. For any positive integer n , we define [ ] {1,..., } n n = , n the bit length of n . By convention, all vectors are in column form and are named using bold lower-case letters (e.g. u ), and i u denotes the ith component of u . Matrices are named using bold capital letters (e.g. U ), and i u denotes the i-th column vector of U . 
For the coefficient vector
we define the cyclic rotation
and the circulant matrix
Rot( ) u is called the rotation basis of the ideal lattice ( ) u .
An ideal I R is called principal if it only has a single generator. The classical hardness of LWE obtains progress. Peikert [10] showed that LWE with 2 n p = modulus is as hard as ndimensional GapSVP using a classical reduction. Recently, Brakerski, Langlois, Peikert, Regev, and Stehlé [11] showed that solving n -dimensional LWE with poly( ) n modulus implies an equally efficient solution to a worst-case lattice problem in dimension n .
Definition 2.2 (Learning with Errors in a Ring of Integers (Ring-LWE) [9]). Let
The LWE with small parameters remain to be hard. Applebaum, Cash, Peikert, and Sahai [12] showed that LWE becomes no easier to solve when the secret key s 's coefficients are sampled from the noise distribution , rather than uniformly at random. Moreover, Micciancio and Peikert [13] show the hardness of LWE with small parameters. They prove that LWE remains hard even when the errors are small, if the number of samples is small enough, whereas prior results required the errors to draw from a Gaussian-like distribution and to have magnitude at least n . On the other hand, there is a sub-exponential time algorithm for the LWE with noise less than n [15] , when the number of samples is not restricted.
Theorem 2.3 ([13]). Let n and
(1 (1 / log )) m n n = + be integers, and
a sufficiently large polynomial bounded (prime) modulus. Then solving LWE with parameters , , n m p and uniformly random errors on set { 1,0,1} is at least as hard as approximating lattice problems in the worst case on ( / log ) n n -dimensional lattices within a fac-
ONE-ROUND 2-PARTY DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
In this section, we will first describe our construction, which use a fact that adding a small integer to a large integer does not affect the most significant bit of large integer with high probability. Then we show the security of our construction. Next, we will extend the construction from Ring-LWE to LWE. Finally, we implement our scheme based on Ring-LWE. Key Exchange. Assume that Alice and Bob want to decide upon a shared secret key. They perform the following steps.
(1) Alice selects 1 ( , , ) a b b . This is a contradiction with the assumption that RLWE is hard.
Extension to LWE
We directly extend the construction above from Ring-LWE to LWE by using matrix form. (1) Alice selects 1 1 , Proof. The proof is similar as one of Theorem 3.1.
Setup. Choose a random matrix
n n p F S E ,
Implementation
In this section, we implement our construction based on Ring-LWE with small parameters. The parameters of our implementation are in Table 1 , whose unit of length is bit. In Table 1 , the first part is to use the origin parameters defined in [9] to guarantee provable security of our construction. The second part is to use the small parameters defined in [13] to improve its efficiency, but its security is based on the hardness of conjecture on Ring-LWE. The third part is to use LWE with small parameter defined in [13] . For every dimension n in Table 1 , we test 100 experiments to check the success probability of our protocol. The experimentation demonstrates that a shared key in every experiment is generated with probability almost 1.
Under the condition of small parameters, the security of our construction based on LWE depends upon the hardness of the worst-case lattice problem by Theorem 2.3. However, its complexity of communication is increased a factor n. On the other hand, the construction based on ring-LWE has higher efficient, but its security is only conjectured hard. Although the number of samples m is equal to n for ring-LWE, and satisfies to the condition (1 (1 / log )) m n n = + in Theorem 2.3, we cannot generalize the result of Theorem 2.3 from LWE to Ring-LWE. Assumption 3.1. Let n be integers, and
a sufficiently large polynomial bounded (prime) modulus. Then solving Ring-LWE with parameters , n p and uniformly random errors on set { 1,0,1} is at least as hard as approximating ideal lattice problems in the worst case on ( / log ) n ndimensional lattices within a factor ( ) n p = .
CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEM
We have constructed a one-round Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, whose security is based upon the hardness of ring-LWE (or LWE), and is as hard as approximating standard ideal lattice (or lattice) problems in the worst case with polynomial factor.
Our construct only works in two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange. One interesting open problem is to construct multi-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange using ring-LWE. 
